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Abstract 
Motivated by agency conflicts of real earnings management (e.g., opportunistic and 
signalling perspectives), this study investigates the association between firms that manipulate 
their business operations to meet earnings benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings, last year’s earnings) 
and subsequent operating performance. We examine the effects of the magnitude of real 
earnings management on firms’ future performance for the period 2009 to 2015 for UK firms. 
Our analysis shows that the manipulation of operating activities such as sales, discretionary 
expenditures, and production costs to meet earnings benchmarks has a significantly positive 
consequence for firms’ subsequent operating performance and signals firms’ good future 
performance. We also find that firms that manipulate their operating activities in the absence 
of meeting earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their subsequent operating 
performance. The findings of this research lend support to our understanding of the process 
that management follows to evaluate costs and benefits of real earnings management.  
Keywords: Earnings benchmarks; Future performance; Opportunistic perspective; Real 
earnings management; Signalling perspective 
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1. Introduction  
Since reported earnings are the outcome of accounting choices and the underlying 
business operations, firms may utilise alternative earnings management tools to manipulate 
their earnings to achieve certain earnings benchmarks (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). The common tools of earnings 
management can be classified into two categories: accrual-based earnings management (AEM) 
and real earnings management (REM). AEM takes place when managers control their reported 
earnings through exploitation of the accounting discretion associated with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). REM involves managers’ efforts to alter their reported earnings 
by making suboptimal decisions on the timing and scales of underlying business activities 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). While AEM has no direct cash flow consequences and is therefore less 
likely to destroy long-term firm value (Dechow et al., 2010), REM influences operations with 
direct effects on cash flows. Therefore, to achieve a good stock market performance and 
financial position, managers are incentivised to manage earnings based on accounting numbers 
not only to maximise the value of the firms but also to extract private benefits (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999). 
In this study, we examine the relationships between REM and firms’ subsequent 
operating performance. Specifically, we investigate whether United Kingdom (UK) firms that 
manipulate their sales, discretionary expenses and production around zero earnings and last 
year’s earnings to report higher earnings realise an impact from these activities on future 
financial performance. We adopt Roychowdhury’s (2006) and Gunny’s (2010) criteria to 
identify firms that are more likely to manage earnings upward. Specifically, we achieve this 
based on the firms’ ability to meet (1) zero earnings, and (2) last year’s earnings.1 
                                                          
1 Due to data access limitations, this study does not explore the third benchmark, “analysts’ forecast”. 
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The capital market incentives of managers, such as meeting or beating important earnings 
benchmarks, e.g., reporting positive profit, avoiding earnings decrease and avoiding negative 
earnings surprises, are stronger around firms that are more likely to manipulate their earnings. 
An enormous body of literature explains the association between earnings management and 
different motivations. In turn, this association may influence the earnings management choices 
of firms. (Degeorge, et al., 1999; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Graham et al., 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) explain that, based on transaction and 
information costs, investors derive economic decisions from heuristics or reference points, such 
as zero level or earnings changes, as well on the ‘surprises’ that zero earnings generate. In this 
way, a loss or decrease in earnings may send a negative signal to outsiders, particularly credit 
rating agencies and stock analysts who assess the firm. This signal, in turn, negatively affects 
a firm’s credit ratings and the costs of the debt. However, outsiders may attach different weights 
to such a signal, depending on the firm’s previous signals.  
Prior research on earnings management reveals two oppositional consequences of REM. 
One view is the ‘opportunistic earnings management’ argument that managers who use REM 
deviations from normal business strategy to manage reported earnings opportunistically 
mislead outside investors on their assessments of firms’ performance, thus potentially leading 
to a decline in subsequent performance. Consistent with this view, the prior literature has 
documented that firms that engage in REM experience a negative impact on subsequent 
financial performance and firm value (Bens et al., 2002). Moreover, prior research observes a 
decline in future performance among firms that engage in higher REM to meet certain financial 
reporting benchmarks (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; De Jong et al., 2014; Alhadab et al., 2015; Francis et al., 
2016a; Kothari et al., 2016; Leggett et al., 2016). 
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The opposite view is the ‘signalling earnings management’ argument, which claims that 
firms utilise REM to signal good future performance and distinguish themselves from poor 
performance (Roychowdhury, 2006). REM may not necessarily result in a more significant 
decline in firms’ subsequent performance. For example, the manipulations of operating 
activities are less likely to significantly affect the operations of firms that occupy strong 
financial and market positions and intend to use earnings to communicate favourable private 
information about future performance (Zang, 2012). Consistent with this view, prior research 
observed a positive impact on the client’s cash flow and good future performance among firms 
that manage earnings upward by utilising more REM to meet/beat earnings benchmarks 
(Bartov et al., 2002; Gunny, 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012). 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in a number of ways. First, it 
contributes to the extant empirical research on the relationship between REM and future 
performance (e.g., Taylor and Xu, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016; Leggett et al., 2016) by providing 
empirical evidence on the relationships between the three types of REM to meet zero earnings 
and last year’s earnings and future operating performance in UK-listed firms. To the best of 
our knowledge, there is limited evidence on the relationship between REM and future 
performance around firms that meet zero earnings and last year’s earnings (Gunny, 2010; Zhao 
et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2016a). The studies in this field are US-based, and there is no 
empirical evidence for the UK context.  
Second, this study is the first to use the absolute value of each measure to capture the 
general level of REM activities on future operating performance. For example, Gunny (2010) 
examines a United States (US) sample and uses REM activities as the indicator variable equal 
to one if the residual from Research and Development (R&D), Selling, General, and 
Administrative expenses (SG&A), and production models is in the lowest (highest) quintile 
and zero otherwise. In contrast to previous research (e.g., Gunny, 2010), we consider how to 
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avoid the drawbacks of binning continuous variables. That is, we assess the potential loss of 
power and loss of precise average effects that could arise by estimating the mean effect of the 
measures in the upper quantile rather than estimating the means effect of all observations 
(Harrell, 2015).  
Finally, previous methodological work on the consequences of earnings management 
focuses on cross-sectional dependence (e.g., Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012) but does not 
examine the issues created by the presence of both cross-sectional and time-series dependence. 
In this study, we use the Newey-West standard error-corrected Fama-MacBeth procedure as a 
method that corrects for dependence in one direction and typically assumes independence in 
the other2. This therefore adds value to the robustness of the results by correcting for potential 
bias and inconsistency issues in the estimates and overcoming heteroscedasticity problems. 
In the UK context, the accounting standards setting does differ from that in the US, which 
could affect the inferences drawn from this research (e.g., the mandatory adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the UK). If mandatory IFRS adoption 
has an influence, either positive or negative, on AEM, it may also have an influence on REM. 
However, Cohen et al. (2008) and Zang (2012) provide evidence that the presence of tighter 
accounting standards and less accounting flexibility leads managers to substitute AEM with 
REM, clarifying that REM can occur independent of manipulation through AEM. It is, 
however, more difficult to track REM for outsiders as it can be masked in the form of everyday 
business transactions, by involving, for example, decisions about changes in the timing or 
structuring of a transaction (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Under IFRS, for instance, research and 
advertising costs are expensed in the period in which they are incurred. Therefore, reducing 
these costs reported affects income. Moreover, developments costs are, in the first instance, 
                                                          
2 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we run an ordinary least squares model with robust standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm or a firm-fixed effect model instead of a Fama-McBeth 
model.   
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expensed rather than capitalised due to uncertainty issues regarding the developing product 
(International Accounting Standard Board (IASB, 1998). Therefore, postponing development 
projects can also increase earnings. 
In addition, there are numerous differences associated with institutional and capital 
market characteristics between countries. US capital markets are much larger than those in the 
UK and are arguably subject to more regulatory scrutiny. Ball et al. (2000) recognise that the 
UK has the least regulated accounting, least regulated litigations and least issuance of public 
debt. Moreover, Brown and Higgins (2001) find evidence that UK firms have smaller holdings 
of stock than their US counterparts do and thus suggest that managers in those UK firms have 
fewer incentives to manage earnings to avoid reporting bad news. In addition, recent literature 
has shown that differences in the expectations of management behaviour in different countries 
may explain the differences in the level of earnings management practices across countries 
(Leuz et al., 2003; Brown and Higgins, 2005; Han et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2016b). Thus, it 
is not clear that UK firms have the same incentives to meet earnings benchmarks as those in 
the US. 
While the previous empirical results are mixed, our findings show that UK firms utilising 
REM to meet earnings benchmarks do not necessarily have significantly negative 
consequences for firms’ subsequent operations. Therefore, our findings are in line with the 
signalling earnings management argument in which firms that meet earnings benchmarks 
utilise REM activities to convey their private information to signal their future good 
performance and distinguish themselves from poor performance; this subsequently enhances 
investors’ ability to predict firms’ performance. In the absence of meeting earnings, the results 
also support the opportunistic earnings management argument. Therefore, investors are misled 
in their assessment of firms’ performance. 
Our findings have two important implications for both standard setting and stock market 
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participants. First, it informs regulators about how managers use accounting judgment using 
REM to meet earnings benchmarks and to make financial statements more informative for 
investors and financial analysts. This, as argued by Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 369), “can 
arise if certain accounting choices or estimates are perceived to be credible signals of a firm’s 
financial performance”. In addition, regulators and stock market authorities may consider those 
actions that deviate from normal operational business activities to reduce the scope of earnings 
management by increasing levels of corporate disclosure and enhancing the quality of 
corporate reporting. Second, by facilitating a better understanding of REM on firms’ future 
performance, stock market participants (e.g. investors and financial analysts) may consider the 
consequences of REM activities as well as AEM activities when they making investment 
decisions. 
The reminder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample, data, and research design. Section 4 
presents the empirical findings and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.   
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Since all REM activities lead to higher net income in the current period, these activities 
will inevitably have consequences. However, the empirical results are mixed. Hence, the 
conflicting empirical results regarding the positive or negative influence of REM on 
performance have attracted opposing explanations for why the managers adopt REM. 
2.1. Future performance through the opportunistic earnings management argument 
The extant literature shows that when a firm’s REM manages-up earnings, this reduces 
the firm’s value, which will harm the firm’s future performance (value destroying). In the 
absence of meeting earnings benchmarks, Bens et al. (2002) find that firms that manipulate 
earnings shift capital away from real investment to stock repurchases by reducing the R&D 
experience a marginally negative impact on future operating performance. Other studies also 
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find that firms — whether they engage in REM activities — with high net operating assets 
experience a significantly negative impact on subsequent operating performance (Barton and 
Simko, 2002; Hirshleifer et al., 2004). In a recent study, Mizik (2010) finds that firms that 
manage earnings upward by engaging in myopic REM activities through reducing marketing 
and R&D spending experience a greater negative impact on future stock returns and future 
financial performance. Recently, Vorst (2016) shows that, on average, firm-years with real 
activity manipulation (e.g., a reversal of an abnormal cut in discretionary investment) are 
associated with lower long-term operating performance. However, he finds that such results 
vary significantly depending on the various incentives offered to engage in REM, as well as 
other factors that affect its associated costs and benefits.  
Focusing on REM to meet analysts’ earnings forecast, Graham et al. (2005) document 
that chief financial officers (CFOs) are willing to manipulate REM activities to meet analysts’ 
earnings expectations, even if such manipulations would decrease long-term firm value.3 The 
surveyed chief executive officers and CFOs acknowledge that they face a trade-off between 
meeting short-term earnings targets and making long-term optimal business decisions.4 
Furthermore, they argue that 80% of the participants wish to adopt REM to achieve short-term 
earnings targets. On the extent to which managers sacrifice real resources to manage earnings, 
Graham et al. (2005) show that more than 55% of the managers forfeit positive net present 
value investment projects to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts. Other research on myopic 
behaviour and REM confirms Graham and colleagues’ survey evidence suggesting that 
managers engage in myopic behaviour to meet/beat earnings benchmarks, which is costly and 
directly harmful to a firm’s future operation (Baber et al., 1991; Bhojraj and Libby, 2005; Ewert 
and Wagenhofer, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006).  
                                                          
3 Graham et al. (2005) find that CFOs prefer to manage earnings via economic actions such as postponing or 
eliminate hiring, R&D, advertising, or even investment rather than within-GAAP accounting choices.  
4 The primary incentives for managers to meet short-term objectives are stock prices and career and reputation 
concerns (Graham et al., 2005). 
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Moreover, Zhang (2008) evinces that US firms that meet analysts’ cash flow forecast 
engage in higher REM activities through discretionary expenditures, production and sales to 
inflate earnings. Additionally, they find that REM firms experience deterioration in subsequent 
operating performance. Furthermore, Bhojraj et al. (2009) show that firms that beat analysts’ 
forecasts have negative operating future performance and stock market performance in the 
subsequent three years. In a similar study to that of Zhang (2008), Leggett et al. (2016) show 
that firms that engage in REM through discretionary expenditures are negatively associated 
with lower subsequent future performance in terms of both return on assets and cash flows 
from operations than non-REM firms meeting/beating earnings benchmarks. However, the 
notion that REM is value destroying is consistent with investor perceptions. In a recent survey, 
De Jong et al. (2014) find that analysts perceive that meeting earnings benchmarks and 
smoothing earnings enhances investors’ perceptions of firm future performance and that all 
earnings management actions to meet earnings benchmarks, excluding share repurchases, have 
the potential to be value destroying.  
Focusing on REM to just meet/beat zero earnings and last year’s earnings, Francis et 
al. (2016a) examine whether firms that utilised REM to manage earnings upward are associated 
with the subsequent stock price risk, which is due to stocks being mispriced under REM. They 
find that prior REM has a positive association with stock price crashes in the subsequent period. 
This result suggests that managers utilised REM activities to hide negative information but not 
positive information. In addition, they find that the impact of REM on the stock return-crash 
risk increases after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. By examining a sample of all of 
California’s non-profit hospitals, Eldenburg et al. (2011) report a negative relationship between 
REM and subsequent operating performance with managers whose compensation is more 
strongly tied to their performance.  
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Given that previous research on the consequences of REM pays little attention to the 
bond market, Ge and Kim (2014) find that REM activities through overproduction causes credit 
ratings to decline, and their results also show that overproduction and sales-based manipulation 
increase the cost of borrowing money from the bond market. Similarly, Kim and Sohn (2013) 
report a positive association between US firms in which utilised REM meet/beat an earnings 
target and the implied cost of equity even after controlling for the effects of AEM.  
Apart from future performance, several studies examine other effects of real activity 
manipulation to maintain high stock prices (e.g., equity-offering firms). For instance, 
Wongsunwai (2013) finds that IPO firms manage earnings around the IPO year and that IPO 
firms backed by higher-quality venture capitalists generally exhibit higher performance; thus, 
they have lower real and accrual-based manipulation on average. Similarly, Alhadab et 
al. (2015) show that UK IPO firms that manage up earnings during the IPO year, either through 
REM activities or AEM, have a higher probability of IPO failure and lower survival rates in 
subsequent periods. In addition, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2016) provide 
evidence that, at the time of SEO, a firm that engages in income-increasing REM has a more 
negative future operating performance in the post-offering period than other firms that engage 
in AEM.  
2.2. Future performance through the signalling earnings management argument 
REM may not necessarily have a significantly negative effect on firms’ future operations, 
signalling an argument that claims that managers have better information about firms’ future 
market and growth potential. They engage in REM because it is a way to signal firms’ future 
value. The findings in the existing research present different views on the relationship between 
REM activities and future operating performance. Focusing on two common earnings 
benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings and last year’s earnings), Gunny (2010) examines the 
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association between income-increasing REM and future performance.5 She finds evidence that 
US firms that manage earnings upward to meet/beat earnings benchmarks achieve a more 
positive impact on the client’s cash flow and subsequent operating performance than other 
firms in the absence of just meeting/beating earnings benchmarks or managing earnings 
upward through REM. This supports the signalling argument that firms use REM to signal 
good future performance.  
Zhao et al. (2012) support Gunny’s (2010) findings; they find evidence that managers 
are generally willing to manage earnings upward through REM to meet/beat earnings 
benchmarks. In addition, they find a negative relationship between the abnormal REM and 
future performance in the absence of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks, but firm-years 
with abnormal REM that intend to just meet/beat earnings benchmarks are associated with 
higher future performance.  
Taylor and Xu (2010) provide evidence that US firms that meet/beat zero earnings and 
analysts’ forecast with high abnormal production costs or/and low abnormal discretionary 
expenditures do not experience, on average, a more significant decline in firms’ subsequent 
operating performance than control firms do when matched by industry, year and abnormal 
AEM. Their findings are consistent with those of Gunny (2010) and Zhao et al. (2012), which 
suggest that used-only REM offers more positive signalling effects about future firms’ 
performance than firms that used only AEM. Moreover, previous studies have observed good 
future performance among firms, which manipulated earnings to meet/beat the analysts’ 
forecasts (Bartov et al., 2002; Roychowdhury, 2006; Koh et al., 2008).6 
                                                          
5 Gunny (2010) uses indicator variables and classifies REM firms in the most extreme quintile of abnormal REM 
activities.  
6 Tan and Jamal (2006) suggest that managers manipulate operating activities by reducing the level of accounting 
discretion (e.g., reduce their investments in R&D and increase those in advertising) to communicate their firm’s 
superior earnings prospects to investors, and they attain costs and benefits of REM that allow the firm to perform 
better in future performance (signalling mechanism). In addition, managers may also manipulate earnings to 
extract personal benefits. 
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2.3. Hypotheses development  
Under the agency theory perspectives, the net effect of earnings management on a firm’s 
value depends on whether managers manipulate earnings mainly to serve their own interest 
(opportunistic earnings management) and thus mislead investors on their assessments of firms’ 
performance (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and Park, 1997). On the 
other hand, due to information asymmetry, investors usually do not have as much information 
as the managers. Therefore, managers may use earnings to communicate their private 
information on firms’ future performance and thus improve earnings’ informativeness by 
providing more timely measures of a firm’s future performance (Demski, 1998; Kothari, 2001; 
Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001). In addition, if managers sacrifice short-term value to 
manipulate earnings to signal their firms’ future performance (signalling earnings 
management) and the market recognises the information in the signal, the benefits may offset 
the costs and eventually increase a firm’s value, thus protecting its long-term value.  
Conflicting empirical results regarding the positive or negative influence of REM on 
performance have generated opposing explanations regarding the reasons the managers adopt 
REM. A negative correlation is found between REM activities and future performance of firms, 
which suggests that an opportunistic mechanism may affect the assumption of REM (e.g., 
Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Mizik, 2010; Zang, 2012; De Jong et al., 2014; Francis et al., 2016a; Kothari et al., 2016; 
Leggett et al., 2016; Vorst, 2016), while a positive correlation between REM and future 
performance of firms suggests that the signalling mechanism may affect the adoption of REM 
(e.g., Gunny, 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012).  
Nonetheless, there is little evidence on the impact of REM activities on future operating 
performance around firms that meet/beat zero earnings and last year’s earnings. However, from 
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the above empirical literature, since all earnings manipulation activities lead to higher income 
in the current period, there are some consequences of these activities; these could either be 
opportunistic choices or signalling choices of managers, and thus, the results are mixed. 
However, if firms tend to manage earnings for opportunistic reasons and manipulate their 
operating activities on a regular basis, their operating performance is likely to deteriorate in the 
future. On the other hand, manipulations of operating activities are less likely to significantly 
affect the operations of firms that are in strong financial and market positions and that intend 
to use earnings to communicate favourable private information about future performance. 
Compared to other firms, firms that are just meeting/beating important earnings benchmarks 
around zero earnings and last year’s earnings have higher incentives to engage in REM 
manipulation and are expected to experience negative (positive) effects on their future 
performance. By taking three measures of REM for firms to meet zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings in addition to industry-adjusted returns on assets as measures of financial operating 
performance, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an association between UK firms that manipulate their sales, 
discretionary expenses and production in the presence of meeting earnings benchmarks (i.e., 
zero earnings and last year’s earnings) and future operating performance. 
Hypothesis 2: There is an association between UK firms that manipulate their sales, 
discretionary expenses and production in the absence of meeting earnings benchmarks (i.e., 
zero earnings and last year’s earnings) and future operating performance.  
3. Data and methodology  
3.1. Sample  
Financial and market data were extracted from Datastream and Worldscope databases 
for all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).7 Data on the industry classification 
                                                          
7 To increase the sample size, this study does not restrict the sample to the firms with December fiscal year-end. 
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were initially based on international standard industrial classification (ISIC). We start our 
sample period in 2009, taking into account the possibility that managers may have been 
incentivised to manipulate earnings in response to the 2008 financial crisis. The sample ended 
in 2015 because of the requirement for data for two subsequent years’ performance. Following 
prior research, we exclude firms that operate in regulated industries (with SIC codes between 
4400 and 5000) and financial institutions (with SIC codes between 6000 and 6500). Since the 
anticipation models to estimate abnormal REM were realised by the 2-digit SIC industry, we 
exclude industries with fewer than seven firms from the sample (Peasnell et al., 2005). After 
excluding firm-year observations without sufficient data to calculate all measures of REM 
activity, control variables, and missing data, we ultimately had 4,487 observations to test H1 
and H2.  
3.2. Descriptive statistics of the final sample by industry  
         Table 1 shows the industry distribution of the final sample by presenting the number of 
observations and percentage for each industry (division), which consists of 930 firms from 49 
industries. In addition, the sample firms come from a variety of industries, and we focus on 
several divisions. The most heavily represented industries are in manufacturing with 1,452 
firms (32.36%, 2-digit SIC code 20-39), and 32.74% are in services with 1,469 firms (2-digit 
SIC code 70-89). This is followed by the mining division (21.68%, SIC code 10-14), the retail 
trade division (7.24%, 2-digit SIC code 52-59), the division of construction (3.48%, 2-digit 
SIC code 14-17), and the division of wholesale trade (2.5%, 2-digit SIC code 50-51).  
3.3. Measures of real earnings management  
Because we implement the standard models used to measure REM, we describe our 
measurements of REM activities in Appendix A in greater detail. We draw on metrics 
developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and employed by Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. 
(2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Badertscher (2011) and Zang (2012) to construct our 
 
 
15 
15 
 
earnings management metrics. Specifically, our REM measures are (1) abnormal levels of cash 
flow from operations (Ab_CFO), (2) abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX), and (3) 
abnormal production costs (Ab_PROD). We further aggregate these individual measures by 
computing two robust metrics of abnormal real activities to assess the overall level of real 
activity manipulation. For the first aggregate measure, REM_1 — consistent with Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) — we multiply Ab_DISEX by negative one and add it to 
Ab_PROD. A higher amount of this aggregate measure implies that suspect firm-years are 
more likely to be cutting discretionary expenses and overproduction to increase reported 
earnings. For the second measure, REM_2 — again, consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
and Zang (2012) — Ab_CFO and Ab_DISEX are multiplied by negative one and then 
aggregated into one measure. For REM_1, we multiply it by negative one so that the higher 
these amounts, are the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in sales-based manipulation 
and cutting discretionary expenses to manage reported earnings upwards.  
3.4. Empirical model 
To examine the consequences of REM on future operating performance, the current study 
tests whether the two conflict effects of REM activities (“value destroying” and “signalling”) 
of firms that just meet earnings benchmarks have an impact on subsequent future performance. 
We estimate the following regression model with pooled ordinary least squares regressions and 
corrected the time-series cross-sectional dependencies in the data by using the Newey-West 
(1987)-corrected Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedures.8  
𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗  𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼2 ∗ 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎3 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎4 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼5 ∗
 𝑍_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝑎6 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎7 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎8 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎9 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                  (1)                                                                                                                                                       
                                                          
8 The procedures of Fama-Macbeth are used as follows: in the first step, a time-series standard error regression 
for each cross-sectional distribution of coefficients (e.g., firm- or portfolio-specific) is estimated. Then, in the 
second step, the final coefficients’ estimates are obtained by basing inferences on the mean and standard deviation 
of the resulting coefficients: in other words, the Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are based on the mean and standard 
error of the time-series of coefficients from cross-sectional regressions. 
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    Most academic studies attempt to identify earnings management but do not provide 
evidence on its magnitude; the current study addresses this by examining the relationship 
between the magnitude of REM proxies and future performance. In this model, the dependent 
variable is one-year-ahead industry-adjusted financial performance return on assets 
(Adj_ROAt+1) that is augmented with each REM activities’ measures, calculated as the 
differences between firm-specific ROA and median ROA for the same year and industry (2-
digit SIC code) as a direct measure of the firm’s longer-term cash flow.9 AREM refers to one 
of the five measures for abnormal REM activities: the dependent variables Ab_CFO, 
Ab_PROD, Ab_DISEX and aggregate measures of real earnings management; REM_1 and 
REM_2. The coefficients on AREM capture the main effects of abnormal REM activities on 
future performance. “Suspect” is defined as an indicator variable for suspect firm-years just 
meeting earnings benchmarks (i.e., zero benchmarks and last year’s benchmarks). 
Suspect*AREM is an interaction term that captures the incremental effects of abnormal REM 
activities in the presence of meeting earnings benchmarks. Finally, to capture the total “value 
destroying” and “signalling” impacts of REM activities, we test the sum of the coefficient on 
AREM, (𝛂7) and the coefficient on the interaction terms of firms in the presence of just meeting 
earnings benchmarks Suspect*AREM, (𝛂9).  
3.5. Measurements of control variables 
To avoid the problem of correlated omitted variables, we base our main set of control 
variables on prior studies that suggest several factors that affect future operating performance 
(e.g., Gunny, 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Leggett et al., 2016). To be 
consistent with the dependent variable, all continuous independent variables are industry-
adjusted.10 The potential influence of a size effect is controlled by adding firm size (LnMVE) 
                                                          
9 In sensitivity analyses, we also examine two- and three-year-ahead performance and check the results with an 
alternative firm’s performance variable (industry-adjusted return on equity). 
10 The variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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to the regression model, calculated as the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. Fama and 
French (1992) demonstrate that market capitalisation offers an important representation of the 
future expectations of the firm. To control for the life cycle of the firm, growth opportunities 
are included in the regression models as a control variable because Fama and French (1992) 
note that growth opportunities are a direct signal of the relative future prospects of firms and 
are calculated as the ratio of the market value of common equity divided by the book value of 
equity or market-to-book (MTB) ratio. Following Zang (2012), the current study uses the 
bankruptcy prediction model developed by Altman (1968, 2000), which is represented here by 
the Altman Z_score, to control for the financial health of the firm. A higher Z_score implies a 
firm’s healthier financial condition, and a lower Z_score implies poorer financial condition of 
firms.11 
Loss is measured as the indicator variable equal to one when net income before 
extraordinary items is negative and zero otherwise and is included in the model because 
earnings are less persistent for firms with negative income.12 We also include the current-period 
industry-adjusted financial profitability to control for the time-series properties (i.e., 
persistence) of performance. However, previous research demonstrates that there is a 
significantly positive association between one-year-ahead earnings and past-period earnings 
(Sloan, 1996; Dechow et al., 2003; Kraft et al., 2007, Gunny, 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010). 
Following Kothari and Sloan (1992) and Gunny (2010), to control for the association between 
stock performance and future net income, market-adjusted abnormal returns is a proxy for the 
firm’s market performance. This is included in the regression models as a control variable, 
                                                          
11 The Altman Z_score model is Z_score = 0.3*(X1) + 1.0*(X2) + 1.4*(X3) + 1.2*(X4) + 0.6*(X5), where Z_score 
represents the Altman (1968, 2000) distress score with which the relative financial condition of the firm can be 
explained based on magnitude and sign, measured at the beginning of year t. X1 represents the net income before 
extraordinary items are added to the total assets ratio. X2 represents the total sales to the total assets ratio. X3 
represents the retained earnings to the total assets ratio. X4 represents the working capital to the total assets ratio. 
X5 represents the market value of equity to the total liabilities ratio. 
12 Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence that firms with higher net incomes are less likely to manage earnings and 
engage in REM.  
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calculated as the difference between monthly buy-and-hold raw returns and the monthly market 
buy-and-hold return, compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year t.13 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 (Panel A and Panel B) presents the descriptive statistics for all variables in the 
empirical models comparing suspect firm-years just meeting zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings with the non-suspect firm-years. The mean industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) 
are -10.3% and -10.4% for the subsequent dependent variable (Adj_ROAt+1) and current year 
industry-adjusted return on assets (Adj_ROA), respectively. The medians for both are, on 
average, zero, which is estimated because the variables are calculated by deducting the 
industry-year median from the firms’ perceived return on assets. 
The suspect firm-years in Panel A and Panel B have significantly lower values for 
Ab_DISEX than non-suspect firm-years, which suggests that suspect firm-years around zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings with low discretionary expenses engage more in real activity 
manipulation. In contrast, in Panel A, the mean REM_1 and REM_2 of suspect firm-years have 
significantly higher means than non-suspect firm-years, suggesting that the firm also engages 
in real activity manipulation. The mean Ab_CFO and Ab_PROD of suspect firm-years around 
zero earnings have a higher mean, although this is not significant compared to non-suspect 
firm-years. In addition, in Table 2 (Panel B), the mean of Ab_CFO, Ab_PROD, REM_1 and 
REM_2 of the suspect firm-years have a significantly higher mean than the means for the non-
suspect firm-years. This suggests that suspect firm-years that just meet benchmarks around last 
year’s earnings engage in real activity manipulation. 
                                                          
13 Consistent with Bens et al. (2002), this examination uses the 12 months buy-and-hold stock return on the firm’s 
ordinary shares. Gunny (2010, p. 877) computes size-adjusted abnormal returns as “the monthly buy and hold raw 
return minus the monthly buy and hold return on a size matched decile portfolio of firms compounded over 12 
months of fiscal year t”.  
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The mean of Z_score is 7.109, with a median of 2.753, above the cut-off point (1.80: 
Altman, 1968, 2000) of being a healthy firm. These values are comparable to those in Zang 
(2012). The mean of Loss is 0.416 with a median of zero. Approximately 41.6% of the sample 
observations experienced losses, suggesting that firms might have the potential to engage in 
real manipulation. Finally, consistent with prior literature (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen 
et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Leggett et al., 2016), suspect and non-suspect 
firm-years around zero earnings and last year’s earnings are different in numerous financial 
aspects. 
Table 3 provides information about the Pearson and the Spearman correlation 
coefficients of all variables in the future operating performance regression. Adj_ROAt+1 is 
significantly negatively related to three of the five REM measures except REM_1, Ab_DISEX, 
indicating that the main effects of abnormal REM activities on the firm in the absence of just 
meeting important earnings benchmarks is that they perform worse in the future or in signalling 
future performance. However, this reduces the firm’s value which will harm the firm’s future 
performance (value destroying), which is comparable to the findings of prior studies. 
Addressing the correlation coefficients above 0.60 specifically, the Adj_ROAt+1 is significantly 
positive with a current year-adjusted return on assets (Pearson 66%, Spearman 70%), which is 
expected because of earnings persistence. 
 The current and one-year-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets are significantly 
positively correlated with firm size (Pearson 33%, 30%, respectively and Spearman 43%, 46%, 
respectively). This supports the assumption that firms have better current and future 
performance. The subsequent year’s industry-adjusted returns on assets have a strong negative 
correlation with the firms that experience negative net income (Loss), although this is 
significant (Pearson -38.5% and Spearman -50%). 
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The analysis of the correlation among the REM activity proxies reveals that the 
correlation between Ab_PROD and Ab_DISEX is significantly positive (Pearson 35.5% and 
Spearman 52%). This suggests that managers are using real activity manipulation, which leads 
to abnormally high production costs that occur simultaneously with reducing discretionary 
expenditures (Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). There is a significant negative relationship between 
Ab_DISEX and Ab_CFO (Pearson -43%, Spearman -17%); this shows that reduction of 
discretionary expenses frees up more cash flow for the firm. This result is consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). In addition, the positive and 
significant correlation coefficient (34%, Pearson and 42%, Spearman) between Ab_CFO and 
Ab_PROD shows that (a) UK firms could engage in different REM methods at the same time 
to trigger higher reported earnings, and (b) it has a negative effect on cash flow from operations. 
Furthermore, the higher correlation coefficients of abnormal REM and the aggregate 
measures of REM (REM_1, REM_2) are expected because these aggregate measures of REM 
are the sum of two proxies, suggesting that firms engage in real activity manipulation, which 
is consistent with prior research (Zang, 2012). Finally, the mean variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for the independent variables used in the regression analysis of subsequent operating 
performance of firms just meeting zero earnings and last year’s earnings, for all five measures 
of REM, are all less than 1.50, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in this study. 
4.2. Main results 
Table 4 reports the mean coefficient estimates from the Fama-MacBeth regressions. The 
t-statistics are calculated using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-
West procedure. Table 4 (Panels A and B) reports a regression explaining the dependent 
variable (Adj_ROA t+1) over the subsequent one year using the proxies of the REM methods. 
The coefficients’ estimate for Adj_ROA is significantly different from zero and positive in 
each of the REM methods. This indicates that current-period industry-adjusted financial 
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profitability is positively associated with future industry-adjusted ROA (p-value < 0.01), which 
is consistent with the findings from prior empirical studies in the US (e.g., Gunny, 2010; 
Leggett et al., 2016). 
The signs and significance of the control variables are consistent with the results from 
prior studies (e.g., Gunny, 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012 and Leggett et al., 
2016) with only a few exceptions. The coefficients’ estimate on LnMVE is significantly 
different from zero and positive in each of the REM methods, indicating that suspect firm-years 
to meet zero earnings and last year’s earnings have better future performance, which is 
consistent with the findings of Gunny (2010) and Leggett et al. (2016). The coefficients’ 
estimate on MTB is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and is negative in each of the REM 
methods. This indicates that growth firms underperform in the future, which is consistent with 
the findings of Gunny (2010).  
The coefficient estimates on Loss in each of the REM methods of the regression model 
are all significantly negatively associated with future performance (p-value < 0.01). This 
indicates that firms that engage in REM activities in the absence of meeting earnings 
benchmarks perform worse in the future or in signalling future performance compared to other 
firm-years. Zang (2012) points out that future profitability will be more negatively affected by 
REM activities when firms are in poor financial health, whereas coefficients on the Z_score 
are not significant in each of the REM methods, except for the coefficient on aggregate 
measures of real earnings management (REM_2), which is positive and statistically significant 
at 0.002 (t = 2.69) at the 1% level. This finding is in line with a prior empirical study by Gunny 
(2010). On the other hand, no coefficients on return significantly provide information about 
possible future performance. 
Gunny (2010, p. 860) notes that “When examining the relation between future 
performance and RM, I assume RM is an exogenous variable. If RM is endogenously 
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determined such that there is a factor that affects RM and also affects firms’ future performance 
(e.g., RM firm-years being representative of poor performance), then this study suffers from a 
potential correlated omitted variable problem”. Therefore, we carefully control for the 
endogenous relationships between REM and firm future performance with a focus on REM; 
this focus is conditional upon an earnings management incentive, which is to guard against the 
effects of conflicting explanations and the possibility of the omission of correlated variables. 
However, Hypothesis 1 focuses on firms that manipulate their sales, discretionary expenses 
and production in the presence of meeting earnings benchmarks beyond the expanded focus on 
all firms that engage in REM. Hence, the coefficient of interest 𝛂9 represents the performance 
of Suspect firms that is augmented with REM measures compared to other firms. 
The interaction term (Suspect*AREM) in the first three columns of Table 4 (Panels A 
and B), which captures the incremental effects of abnormal REM activities in the presence of 
meeting zero earnings and last year’s earnings, is significantly positively associated with future 
operating performance at the 0.01 significance level, which is consistent with Gunny’s (2010) 
and Zhao et al.’s (2012) findings; this suggests that managers who engage in REM to meet zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings through sales-based manipulation, discretionary expenses, 
and overproduction have better subsequent performance than other firm-years. They also 
convey a signal of superior future performance to the market. In the last two columns of Table 
4, Panels A and B report the results from the regression model with aggregate REM measures. 
The average coefficients on the two aggregate REM measures, Suspect_zero*REM_1 
and Suspect_zero*REM_2, are positive and statistically significant at 0.211 (t = 2.86) and 
0.540 (t = 4.30), respectively. Additionally, the average coefficients on the two aggregate REM 
measures, Suspect_last*REM_1, Suspect_last*REM_2, are positive and statistically 
significant at 0.148 (t = 3.10) and 0.343 (t = 4.99), respectively. Hence, these results confirm 
that to meet zero earnings and last year’s earnings, managers of suspect firm-years who 
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simultaneously engage in discretionary expenses-based manipulation, production costs-based 
manipulation, sales-based manipulation and discretionary expenses-based manipulation have 
better subsequent operating performance.  
Furthermore, the results of the AREM coefficients indicate that the main effects of 
abnormal REM activities are all negative and significant (p-value < 0.01). This is comparable 
to the findings of prior studies (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) and suggests 
the general value destroying of the shareholders’ effect of abnormal REM activities in the 
absence of meeting earnings benchmarks. In other words, firms that do not meet zero earnings 
and firms that do not sustain recent performance but engage in REM activities perform worse 
in the future or in signalling future performance than other firm-years.  
Regarding the joint signalling effect documented by Gunny in her 2010 study, she reports 
that firms that utilise REM to meet earnings benchmarks exhibit significantly better future 
performance than other REM firms that miss the targets, jointly signalling to the market that 
these firms perform better. As shown in Table 4 (Panel A), however, the results of the sum of 
𝛂7 and 𝛂9, which captures the combined “value-destroying” and “signalling” impacts of REM 
activities, show that the term (𝛂7 + 𝛂9) is significantly positive for three of five measures of 
REM — Ab_DISEX, Ab_PROD, and REM_2 (p-value < 0.1 or p-value < 0.01). This indicates 
that just to meet zero earnings, firm-years with engagement in REM activities have better 
subsequent operating performance (have significantly higher industry-adjusted ROA) than 
other firm-years with abnormal REM activities. This result is consistent with joint signalling; 
that is, engaging in REM activities in the presence of meeting the important earnings 
benchmarks to signal superior future performance (e.g., Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012). 
In Panel B of Table 4, the results of the sum of the coefficients Suspect_last*AREM, 𝛂9 
and AREM show that 𝛂7 is significantly positive for one of five measures of REM (Ab_PROD) 
analyses at the 0.05 significance level. This indicates that firm-years to just meet last year’s 
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earnings that engage in REM activities have better subsequent operating performance than 
other firm-years with abnormal REM activities. In addition, in the case of Ab_DISEX, the sum 
of coefficients 𝛂7 (-0.338) and 𝛂9 (0.171) is -0.166. The Wald test t-values of 𝛂7 and 𝛂9 are 
significantly negative at the 0.05 significance level (t = -2.18), indicating that firm-years that 
engage in REM to meet last year’s earnings perform worse in the future or in signalling future 
performance than other firm-years with abnormal REM activities. 
4.3. Robustness checks 
4.3.1. The sensitivity of the results to the period of two-year and three year-ahead industry-adjusted 
return on assets 
The results in Table 5 (Panel A and B) reveal that, in general, are robust when using 
Adj_ROAt+2 as the future performance measure and are consistent with the results from 
Adj_ROAt+1 in Table 4 (Panel A and Panel B). For example, four of the five interaction terms 
of the suspect firm-years of all measures of REM remain the same, and all are significantly 
positively associated with future operating performance in year two at the 0.01 significance 
level. The Ab_CFO that interacted with suspect firm-years (Suspect_zero, Suspect_last) are 
still significantly positive, where the significance levels drop from 1% to 5% and 10%, 
respectively. The significance levels also drop from 1% to 5% on the coefficient of 
Ab_DISEX*Suspect_last; however, it shows no significant differences. 
The main effects of all abnormal REM activities remain the same, and all are negative 
and significant with future operating performance in year two at the 0.01 significance level. In 
addition, the combined coefficients on the interaction terms of abnormal REM (𝛂7, 𝛂9), which 
represents the full impact of REM on a firm’s subsequent two-year operating performance, are 
also positive and significant at the 0.01 significance level in the abnormal production cost 
analysis. However, the combined coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 
0.05 significance level in the abnormal discretionary expenses analysis. Furthermore, the other 
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combined coefficients of 𝛂7 and 𝛂9 maintain the same sign but are no longer statistically 
significant. Overall, the results generally remain unchanged, suggesting that our findings are 
robust to the subsequent operating performance in year two as well as in their performance in 
year one.14 
5. Conclusions  
In this study, we focus on a sample of firms listed on the LSE to examine whether there 
is an association between UK firms that manipulate their sales, discretionary expenses and 
production to just meet certain earnings benchmarks and future operating performance. Our 
regression results show that UK firms that manipulate their earnings to meet zero earnings and 
last year’s earnings are all significantly positively associated with future operating 
performance, which is consistent with Gunny’s (2010) and Zhao et al.’s (2012) findings and 
suggests that abnormal REM is intended to meet zero earnings and last year’s earnings and 
transmit a signal of superior future performance to the market. Furthermore, the results also 
show that UK firms that manipulate their earnings are all negatively associated with future 
operating performance, which is comparable to the findings of prior studies (Gunny, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2012). These results suggest a general value destroying outcome of shareholders’ 
effect of abnormal REM activities in the absence of just meeting important benchmarks. 
When drawing evidence-based conclusions, consideration should be paid to some 
limitations identified in this study. One limitation of this study is that we only investigated 
motivation for REM, which is to meet important earnings benchmarks, such as avoiding report 
losses and sustaining recent profit performance. In reality, many other factors could drive 
earnings management such as compensation contracts, avoiding violations of debt covenants, 
                                                          
14 The untabulated results reveal that, in general, are robust when using Adj_ROA t+3 as the future performance 
measure, consistent with the results from Adj_ROAt+1 Adj_ROAt+2. However, the results remain unchanged for 
three-year-ahead, suggesting that our findings are also robust to the subsequent operating performance in year 
three as well as in their performance in years one and two. 
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and investors when managers are generating their financial reports. The second limitation is 
that there is a variety of factors not investigated in this research that can influence REM in a 
number of ways: for example, audit quality, corporate governance or disclosure policies are 
less likely to engage in earnings management. Another limitation with the present study is that 
it examines the manipulation of common business activities, such as sales, discretionary 
expenditures and production, but does not investigate other measures of earnings management, 
such as underinvestment in long-term projects, discretionary investment in R&D, abnormal 
gains on sales of fixed assets and accrual earnings management. Finally, because this study 
focuses on UK data, due to data access limitations, we do not explore the factors mentioned 
above, which are considered important areas in the earnings management literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A Proxies for abnormal real earnings management activities. 
The first measure for REM activities is the abnormal cash flows from operations 
(Ab_CFO). Following previous studies (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011), sales-based manipulations are expected to lead to 
decreased current-period operating cash flows. We express the normal cash flows from 
operations as a linear function of sales revenue and change in sales revenue in the current period 
using the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) as implemented in Roychowdhury (2006). 
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To estimate this model, we run the following cross-sectional regression for each industry and 
year for all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE): 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                  (A-1) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operations for firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡, defined as cash flows from 
operations divided by lagged total assets; TAi,t-1 is the total assets at the beginning of period 𝑡 
for firm 𝑖; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the sales revenue during period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the change in 
sales revenue from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡; 𝑖 is the firm; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. For every firm on the 
LSE, Ab_CFO is computed as actual cash flows from operations minus the normal level of 
cash flows from operations predicted from equation (A-1).  
Another measure for REM activities is abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX). 
Following previous studies (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012), we model discretionary expenses as a linear 
function of lagged sales and then estimate the following model to derive the normal levels of 
discretionary expenses for all firms listed on the LSE cross-sectionally for each industry and 
year,  
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                        (A-2) 
 
where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the discretionary expenses that are defined as the sum of R&D, advertising, 
and selling, general and administrative expenses in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; and 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sales 
revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖. For every firm on the LSE, the Ab_DISEX is 
computed as the difference between the actual discretionary expenses and the normal level of 
discretionary expenses.   
The third measure of REM activities is abnormal production costs (Ab_PROD). Studies 
such as Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), Gunny (2010), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
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Badertscher (2011), and Zang (2012) define production costs as the sum of the cost of goods 
sold and change in inventory during the year, and they express the normal level of production 
costs as a linear function of contemporaneous sales. Following these studies, we estimate the 
following model for normal production costs, 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
                                                                                                                                        (A-3) 
where 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 and the change in 
inventory from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡; and ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 is the change in sales revenue at the beginning of 
year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖. The Ab_PROD is computed as the difference between the actual values of 
production costs and the normal levels predicted from equation (A-3). Equation (A-3) is 
estimated as cross-sectional for each industry and year. 
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Appendix B Variables’ definitions, measurement and sources.  
Variable  Definition/Measurement Data sources 
TA  = Total assets (WC02999).            Worldscope 
SALES  = Sales revenue (WC01001).  Worldscope 
IBEI  = Income before extraordinary items (WC01551).  Worldscope 
CFO = Cash flows from operations (WC04860). Worldscope 
COGS  = Cost of goods sold (WC01051). Worldscope 
INV = Inventories (WC02101). Worldscope 
PROD = Production costs; the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory.  
R&D  = Research and development expenses (WC01201). Worldscope 
ADV and SG&A = Advertising and selling, general and administrative expenses (WC01101). Worldscope 
DISEX = Discretionary expenses; the sum of R&D, ADV and SG&A.  
Ab_CFO = Abnormal cash flows from operations, where Ab_CFO is measured by the estimated residual from the regression equation (A-1).  
Ab_DISEX = Abnormal discretionary expenses, where Ab_DISEX is measured by the estimated residual from the regression equation (A-2).   
Ab_PROD = Abnormal production costs, where Ab_PROD is measured by the estimated residual from the regression equation (A-3).  
REM_1 = The sum of Ab_DISEX*(-1) and Ab_PROD; the higher the values of this aggregate measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is 
engaging in real activity manipulation. 
 
REM_2 = The sum of Ab_CFO*(-1) and Ab_DISEX*(-1); the higher the values of this aggregate measure are, the more likely it is that the firm 
is engaging in real activity manipulation. 
 
ROA = Return on assets; income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets.  
MTB = Market-to-book; the ratio of market value of equity (WC08001) to book value of equity (WC03501), measured at the beginning of 
year t. 
Worldscope 
LnMVE = Logarithm of the market value of equity, measured at the beginning of year t.  
Suspect = An indicator variable for suspect firm-years just meeting/beating important earnings benchmarks.  
Suspect_zero = An indicator variable that is set equal to one if net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 
0.005 and is set equal to zero otherwise, based on Roychowdhury’s (2006) criteria to identify suspect firm-years. 
Worldscope 
Suspect_last = An indicator variable that is set equal to one if the change in net income before extraordinary items from the last year is between 0 
and 0.01 and is set equal to zero otherwise, based on Gunny’s (2010) criteria to identify suspect firm-years. 
 
Loss = An indicator variable equal to one when the net income before extraordinary items is negative and zero otherwise.  
Return  = Market-adjusted abnormal returns are a proxy for the firm’s market performance, calculated as the difference between monthly buy-
and-hold raw returns and the monthly market buy-and-hold returns, compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year t. 
Datastream 
Z_score = Measures the financial strength at the beginning of year t, computed as 0.3*(IBEI/TA) + 1.0*(SALES/TA) + 1.4*(Retained earnings 
(WC03495)/TA) + 1.2*(Working capital (WC03151)/TA) + 0.6*(Market value of equity/Total liabilities (WC03351)). 
Worldscope 
Adj_ROAt+1 = One-year-ahead industry-adjusted financial performance return on assets, calculated as the differences between firm-specific ROA 
and median ROA for the same year and industry (2-digit SIC code) as a direct measure of the firm’s longer-term cash flow. 
 
ROE = Return on equity is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items divided by common equity. (WC08301).  Worldscope 
Adj_ROEt+1 = One-year-ahead industry-adjusted financial performance return on equity, calculated as the differences between firm-specific ROE 
and median ROE for the same year and industry (2-digit SIC code).   
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Table 1 
Final sample classified by industry (SIC) division. 
Division group 
SIC 
division group 
Number of 
industry 
division group 
Number of 
observations 
Percentage 
of sample 
Cum. 
(%) 
Mining SIC 10 – SIC 14 4 973 21.68 21.68 
Construction SIC 15 – SIC 17 3 156 3.48 25.16 
Manufacturing SIC 20 – SIC 39 20 1,452 32.36 57.52 
Wholesale trade SIC 50 – SIC 51 2 112 2.50 60.02 
Retail trade SIC 52 – SIC 59 8 325 7.24 67.26 
Services SIC 70 – SIC 89 12 1,469 32.74 100.00 
Total  49 4,487 100.00%  
 
 
 
34 
34 
 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of suspect firm-years versus non-suspect firm-years. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by suspect_zero firm-years versus non-suspect_zero firm-years. 
                                 (The table is continued on the next page)   
 
 Full sample Suspect_zero firm-years Non-suspect_zero firm-years Difference in 
Variable 
 
N Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max Mean 
Adj_ROAt+1 4,410 -0.103 0.000 0.412 -2.689 0.443 71 -0.040 -0.221 0.129 -0.490 0.442 3,409 -0.100 0.000 0.404 -2.689 0.443 0.060*** 
Adj_ROA 3,557 -0.104 0.000 0.422 -2.837 0.483 73 -0.017 -0.030 0.047 -0.122 0.151 3,484 -0.105 0.000 0.426 -2.837 0.483 0.088*** 
Ab_CFO 3,547 0.000 0.026 0.243 -2.007 1.983 73 0.007 -0.001 0.098 -0.244 0.405 3,474 -0.0001 0.026 0.245 -2.007 1.983 0.007 
Ab_DISEX 3,035 0.000 -0.383 0.362 -3.006 2.871 55 -0.107 -0.120 0.230 -0.861 0.436 2,980 0.002 -0.037 0.364 -3.006 2.871 -0.109*** 
Ab_PROD 2,559 0.000 -0.007 0.333 -2.771 3.317 53 0.035 0.051 0.212 -0.430 0.694 2,506 -0.0007 -0.007 0.335 -2.771 3.317 0.035 
REM_1 2,173 -0.012 0.018 0.553 -4.351 3.625 39 0.119 0.097 0.410 -0.772 1.130 2,134 -0.015 0.018 0.555 -4.351 3.625 0.134** 
REM_2 3,027 -0.001 0.022 0.340 -2.858 2.464 55 0.105 0.127 0.245 -0.581 0.629 2,972 -0.003 0.021 0.341 -2.858 2.464 0.108*** 
Suspect_zero 3,557 0.020 0.000 0.141 0.000 1.000 73 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3,484 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LnMVE 4,487 17.839 17.486 2.349 13.403 24.356 73 17.463 17.334 2.049 14.131 24.123 3,484 17.913 17.554 2.361 13.403 25.356 -0.450* 
MTB 4,487 2.552 1.574 4.936 -14.694 29.137 73 1.377 0.969 1.258 -0.441 5.350 3,484 2.613 1.609 4.943 -14.694 29.137 -1.236*** 
Return 4,336 0.087 -0.014 0.640 -0.892 3.429 73 -0.032 -0.065 0.394 -0.813 1.533 3,425 0.027 -0.035 0.560 -0.892 3.429 -0.059 
Z_score 3,483 7.109 2.753 20.349 -38.838 139.354 71 3.381 2.058 5.123 -2.390 30.631 3,412 7.186 2.780 20.540 -38.838 139.354 -3.805*** 
Loss 4,487 0.416 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 73 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3,484 0.410 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 -0.410*** 
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Panel B:  Descriptive statistics by suspect_last firm-years versus non-suspect_last firm-years. 
(The table is continued on the next page)  
 *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control variables for the full sample, consisting of 4,487 firm-years comparing suspect firm-years 
with non-suspect firm-years around zero earnings and last year’s earnings. The mean, median, standard deviation (SD), minimum and maximum are reported. Suspect_zero 
 Full sample Suspect_last firm-years Non-suspect_last firm-years Difference in 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max Mean 
Adj_ROAt+1 4,410 -0.103 0.000 0.412 -2.689 0.443 387 0.006 0.011 0.141 -1.544 0.442 3,093 -0.113 -0.0005 0.420 -2.689 0.443 0.119*** 
Adj_ROA 3,557 -0.104 0.000 0.422 -2.837 0.483 393 0.009 0.013 0.129 -1.235 0.283 3,164 -0.117 -0.001 0.443 -2.837 0.483 0.126*** 
Ab_CFO 3,547 0.000 0.026 0.243 -2.007 1.983 393 0.032 0.033 0.132 -1.084 0.449 3,154 -0.004 0.024 0.253 -2.007 1.983 0.036*** 
Ab_DISEX 3,035 0.000 -0.383 0.362 -3.006 2.871 324 -0.097 -0.108 0.267 -0.705 1.443 2,711 0.011 -0.032 0.370 -3.006 2.871 -0.108*** 
Ab_PROD 2,559 0.000 -0.007 0.333 -2.771 3.317 285 0.040 0.022 0.268 -0.774 0.944 2,274 -0.005 -0.010 0.340 -2.771 3.317 0.045*** 
REM_1 2,173 -0.012 0.018 0.553 -4.351 3.625 232 0.122 0.106 0.488 -1.405 1.179 1,941 -0.028 0.011 0.558 -4.351 3.625 0.150*** 
REM_2 3,027 -0.001 0.022 0.340 -2.858 2.464 324 0.068 0.082 0.264 -0.810 0.794 2,703 -0.010 0.018 0.347 -2.858 2.464 0.078*** 
Suspect_last  3,557 0.110 0.000 0.313 0.000 1.000 393 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3,164 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LnMVE 4,487 17.839 17.486 2.349 13.403 24.356 393 18.952 18.836 2.319 13.510 24.356 3,164 17.773 17.440 2.328 13.403 24.356 1.179*** 
MTB 4,487 2.552 1.574 4.936 -14.694 29.137 393 2.460 1.730 4.030 -14.694 29.137 3,164 2.604 1.578 4.997 -14.694 29.137 
-0.144 
Return 4,336 0.087 -0.014 0.640 -0.892 3.429 389 0.092 0.023 0.501 -0.892 3.429 3,109 0.017 -0.044 0.564 -0.892 3.429 0.075*** 
Z_score 3,483 7.109 2.753 20.349 -38.838 139.354 388 5.989 2.955 15.199 -13.016 139.354 3,095 7.249 2.727 20.903 -38.838 139.354 -1.260 
Loss 4,487 0.416 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 393 0.155 0.000 0.362 0.000 1.000 3,164 0.432 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 -0.277*** 
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firm-years are the 73 firm-years with reported income before extraordinary items between 0% and 0.5% of the lagged total assets in Panel A. Suspect_last firm-years are the 
393 firm-years with a reported change in net income before extraordinary items from the last year between 0% and 1% in Panel B. Adj_ROAt+1 = One-year-ahead industry-
adjusted financial performance return on assets, calculated as the differences between firm-specific ROA and median ROA for the same year and industry (2-digit SIC code). 
Adj_ROA = The current period industry-adjusted financial performance. Ab_CFO = Abnormal cash flows from operations, where Ab_CFO is measured by the estimated 
residual from the regression equation (A-1). Ab_DISEX = Abnormal discretionary expenses, where Ab_DISEX is measured by the estimated residual from the regression 
equation (A-2). Ab_PROD = Abnormal production costs, where Ab_PROD is measured by the estimated residual from the regression equation (A-3). REM_1 = The sum of 
Ab_DISEX*(-1) and Ab_PROD; the higher the values of this aggregate measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in real activity manipulation. REM_2 = The 
sum of Ab_CFO*(-1) and Ab_DISEX*(-1); the higher the values of this aggregate measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in real activity manipulation. 
LnMVE = Logarithm of the market value of equity, measured at the beginning of year t. MTB = Market-to-book; the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, 
measured at the beginning of year t. Return = Market-adjusted abnormal returns is a proxy for the firm’s market performance, calculated as the difference between monthly 
buy-and-hold raw returns and the monthly market buy-and-hold return, compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year t. Z_score = Measures the financial strength at the 
beginning of year t, computed as  0.3*(Net income before extraordinary items/Total assets) + 1.0*(SALES/Total assets) + 1.4*(Retained earnings/Total assets) + 1.2*(Working 
capital/Total assets) + 0.6*(Market value of equity/Total liabilities). Loss = An indicator variable equal to one when net income before extraordinary items is negative and zero 
otherwise. Differences in means (unequal variances) are tested using t-tests. To limit the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% 
of their distribution.  
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Table 3  
Pearson and Spearman correlations coefficients among all variables in the operating performance regression. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (The table is continued on the next page) 
 
 
 *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
VARIABLE (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Adj_ROAt+1 1.000 0.702*** 0.033*** 0.089*** -0.420*** 0.107*** -0.160*** -0.028 -0.149*** 0.434*** 0.132*** 0.189*** 0.120*** -0.498*** 
(2) Adj_ROA 0.659*** 1.000 -0.390*** 0.106*** -0.480*** 0.131*** -0.171*** -0.019 -0.153*** 0.462*** 0.143*** 0.248*** 0.135*** -0.703*** 
(3) Suspect_zero 0.021 0.029 1.000 0.005 0.028 0.045*** 0.019 0.031 0.051*** -0.024 -0.071*** -0.013 -0.046*** -0.118*** 
(4) Suspect_last 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.005 1.000 -0.402*** 0.131*** 0.057*** 0.098*** 0.087*** 0.158*** 0.024 0.081*** 0.031 -0.177*** 
(5) Ab_CFO -0.354*** -0.529*** -0.004 -0.046*** 1.000 -0.171*** 0.420*** 0.139*** 0.370*** -0.204*** -0.138*** -0.166*** -0.510*** 0.351*** 
(6) Ab_DISEX 0.148*** 0.339*** 0.040*** 0.093*** -0.429*** 1.000 0.520*** 0.860*** 0.770*** 0.071*** -0.133*** 0.010 -0.112*** -0.187*** 
(7) Ab_PROD -0.209*** -0.214* 0.015 0.043*** 0.338*** 0.355*** 1.000 0.829*** 0.736*** -0.008 0.119*** -0.014 -0.043*** 0.033 
(8) REM_1 -0.002 0.086* 0.032 0.084*** -0.055*** 0.836*** 0.809*** 1.000 0.877*** 0.023 -0.151*** -0.020 -0.092*** -0.069*** 
(9) REM_2 -0.075*** -0.007 0.042*** 0.071*** 0.275*** 0.750*** 0.639*** 0.850*** 1.000 -0.044*** -0.167*** -0.083*** -0.112*** 0.030 
(10) LnMVE 0.327*** 0.300*** -0.027 0.156*** -0.123*** 0.039*** -0.009 0.020 -0.027 1.000 0.352*** 0.254*** 0.154*** -0.427*** 
(11) MTB -0.101*** -0.078* -0.035*** -0.009 0.054*** -0.104*** -0.075*** -0.117*** -0.071*** 0.136*** 1.000 0.243*** 0.306*** -0.101*** 
(12) Return 0.025 0.050* -0.015 0.042*** -0.061*** -0.054*** -0.023 -0.069*** -0.099*** 0.120*** 0.106*** 1.000 0.008 -0.265*** 
(13) Z_score -0.003 0.004 0.026 -0.019 0.087*** -0.071*** 0.057*** 0.003 -0.014 0.016 0.150*** -0.049*** 1.000 -0.024 
(14) Loss -0.385*** -0.478*** -0.118*** -0.177*** 0.297* -0.148*** 0.058*** -0.036 0.052*** -0.422* 0.013 -0.102*** 0.190*** 1.000 
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Table 3 shows Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients of all variables in the future operating performance regression for the full sample of firm-year observations (4,487 
firm-year observations). Suspect_zero firm-years are the 73 firm-years with reported income before extraordinary items between 0% and 0.5% of lagged total assets. 
Suspect_last firm-years are the 393 firm-years with reported change in net income before extraordinary items from the last year between 0% and 1%. Adj_ROAt+1 = One-year-
ahead industry-adjusted financial performance return on assets, calculated as the differences between firm-specific ROA and median ROA for the same year and industry (2-
digit SIC code). Adj_ROA = The current period industry-adjusted financial performance. Ab_CFO = Abnormal cash flows from operations, where Ab_CFO is measured by 
the estimated residual from the regression equation (A-1). Ab_DISEX = Abnormal discretionary expenses, where Ab_DISEX is measured by the estimated residual from the 
regression equation (A-2). Ab_PROD = Abnormal production costs, where Ab_PROD is measured by the estimated residual from the regression equation (A-3). REM_1 = 
The sum of Ab_DISEX*(-1) and Ab_PROD; the higher the values of this aggregate measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in real activity manipulation. 
REM_2 = The sum of Ab_CFO*(-1) and Ab_DISEX*(-1); the higher the values of this aggregate measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in real activity 
manipulation. LnMVE = Logarithm of the market value of equity, measured at the beginning of year t. MTB = Market-to-book; the ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity, measured at the beginning of the year t. Return = Market-adjusted abnormal returns is a proxy for the firm’s market performance, calculated as the difference 
between monthly buy-and-hold raw returns and the monthly market buy-and-hold return, compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year t. Z_score = Measures the financial 
strength at the beginning of year t, computed as:  0.3*(Net income before extraordinary items/Total assets) + 1.0*(SALES/Total assets) + 1.4*(Retained earnings/Total assets) 
+ 1.2*(Working capital/Total assets) + 0.6*(Market value of equity/Total liabilities). Loss = An indicator variable equal to one when net income before extraordinary items is 
negative and zero otherwise. To limit the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of their distribution. 
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Table 4 
Regression analysis of subsequent operating performance of firms just meeting earnings 
benchmarks. 
Panel A: Regression analysis of subsequent operating performance of firms just meeting zero 
earnings using Roychowdhury’s (2006) criteria to identify the suspect firm-years of real earnings 
management activities. 
Dependent variable = One-year-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets 
Independent variables Ab_CFO Ab_DISEX Ab_PROD REM_1 REM_2 
Intercept 
-0.378*** 
(-8.70) 
-0.316*** 
(-23.39) 
-0.296*** 
(-9.52) 
-0.373*** 
(-7.70) 
-0.359*** 
(-11.10) 
Adj_ROA 
0.546*** 
(9.15) 
0.595*** 
(17.05) 
0.634*** 
(12.03) 
0.597*** 
(12.32) 
0.577*** 
(11.91) 
LnMVE 
0.020*** 
(8.56) 
0.019*** 
(17.12) 
0.016*** 
(8.71) 
0.021*** 
(8.15) 
0.021*** 
(11.14) 
MTB 
-0.005*** 
(-5.85) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.74) 
-0.004*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.005*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.007*** 
(-5.85) 
Return 
0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.004 
(-0.67) 
0.003 
(0.40) 
-0.002 
(-0.34) 
-0.004 
(-0.75) 
Z_score 
0.001 
(1.03) 
0.004 
(0.26) 
-0.003 
(-1.06) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
0.002*** 
(2.69) 
Loss 
-0.028*** 
(-4.99) 
-0.050*** 
(-13.39) 
-0.032*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.035*** 
(-6.57) 
-0.037*** 
(-9.79) 
AREM 
-0.213*** 
(-8.54) 
-0.336*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.118* 
(-1.81) 
-0.086** 
(-3.08) 
-0.261*** 
(-5.61) 
Suspect_zero 
-0.031** 
(-2.06) 
-0.057*** 
(-5.17) 
-0.042*** 
(-6.68) 
-0.030** 
(-2.46) 
-0.054*** 
(-6.52) 
Suspect_zero*AREM 
0.900*** 
(2.55) 
0.402*** 
(4.57) 
0.341*** 
(16.24) 
0.211*** 
(2.86) 
0.540*** 
(4.30) 
No. of observations 3,346 2,860 2,407 3,354 2,852 
𝛂7 + 𝛂9 0.687 0.066* 0.223*** 0.124 0.279* 
Mean VIF 1.44 1.38 1.34 1.24 1.39 
Adjusted R-squared 0.507 0.508 0.527 0.499 0.503 
 (The table is continued on the next page)
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Panel B: Regression analysis of subsequent operating performance of firms just meeting last 
year’s earnings using Gunny’s (2010) criteria to identify the suspect firm-years of real earnings 
management activities. 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Table 4 reports the estimation results of Fama-Macbeth regressions for the full sample of firm-year 
observations (4,487 firm-year observations) explaining the dependent variable subsequent operating 
performance (Adj_ROAt+1) of firms just meeting zero earnings and last year’s earnings using the proxies of 
the REM methods. The dependent variable (Adj_ROAt+1) = One-year-ahead industry-adjusted financial 
performance return on assets, calculated as the differences between firm-specific ROA and median ROA for the 
same year and industry (2-digit SIC code). Adj_ROA = The current period industry-adjusted financial 
performance. AREM = Refers to one of the five measures for abnormal REM activities; Ab_CFO = Abnormal 
cash flows from operations, where Ab_CFO is measured by the estimated residual from the regression equation 
(A-1); Ab_DISEX = Abnormal discretionary expenses, where Ab_DISEX is measured by the estimated residual 
from the regression equation (A-2); Ab_PROD = Abnormal production costs, where Ab_PROD is measured by 
the estimated residual from the regression equation (A-3); REM_1 = The sum of Ab_DISEX*(-1) and Ab_PROD; 
the higher the values of this aggregate measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in real activity 
manipulation; REM_2 = The sum of Ab_CFO*(-1) and Ab_DISEX*(-1); the higher the values of this aggregate 
measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in real activity manipulation. Suspect = An indicator 
variable for suspect firm-years just meeting earnings benchmarks. Each panel reports the estimation results using 
a different definition of suspect firm-years as discussed below. Panel A reports the results for suspects just meeting 
Dependent variable = One-year-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets 
Independent variables Ab_CFO Ab_DISEX Ab_PROD REM_1 REM_2 
Intercept 
-0.381*** 
(-8.83) 
-0.316*** 
(-24.89) 
-0.300*** 
(-9.85) 
-0.377*** 
(-7.85) 
-0.360*** 
(-11.09) 
Adj_ROA 
0.547*** 
(9.12) 
0.595*** 
(17.16) 
0.634*** 
(12.06) 
0.597*** 
(12.35) 
0.577*** 
(11.97) 
LnMVE 
0.021*** 
(8.53) 
0.019*** 
(17.26) 
0.016*** 
(8.84) 
0.021*** 
(8.04) 
0.021*** 
(10.75) 
MTB 
-0.005*** 
(-5.90) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.65) 
-0.004*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.006*** 
(-5.47) 
-0.007*** 
(-5.81) 
Return 
0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
0.003 
(0.39) 
-0.003 
(-0.39) 
-0.004 
(-0.75) 
Z_score 
0.002 
(1.02) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
-0.003 
(-1.07) 
0.002 
(0.13) 
0.002** 
(2.57) 
Loss 
-0.027*** 
(-4.27) 
-0.046*** 
(-12.34) 
-0.029*** 
(-2.41) 
-0.033*** 
(-6.25) 
-0.034*** 
(-9.20) 
AREM 
-0.212*** 
(-8.39) 
-0.338*** 
(-4.94) 
-0.118* 
(-1.80) 
-0.087** 
(-3.06) 
-0.262*** 
(-5.66) 
Suspect_last 
0.002 
(0.37) 
0.025*** 
(6.48) 
0.012*** 
(4.48) 
0.012 
(1.61) 
0.019*** 
(2.83) 
Suspect_last*AREM 
0.622*** 
(2.79) 
0.171*** 
(2.78) 
0.201*** 
(5.53) 
0.148*** 
(3.10) 
0.343*** 
(4.99) 
No. of observations 3,346 2,860 2,407 3,354 2,852 
𝛂7 + 𝛂9 0.410 -0.166** 0.082** 0.061 0.081 
Mean VIF 1.37 1.19 1.23 1.19 1.20 
Adjusted R-squared 0.506 0.508 0.527 0.499 0.503 
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the zero earnings (Suspect_zero), which are firm-years with earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets 
between 0 and 0.005. Panel B reports results for suspects just meeting last year’s earnings (Suspect_last), which 
are firm-years with the change in net income from the last year between 0 and 0.01. Suspect*AREM = An 
interaction term that captures the incremental effects of abnormal REM activities relative to the presence of just 
meeting benchmarks. LnMVE = Logarithm of the market value of equity, measured at the beginning of year t. 
MTB = Market-to-book; the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, measured at the beginning of 
year t. Return = Market-adjusted abnormal returns is a proxy for the firm’s market performance, calculated as the 
difference between monthly buy-and-hold raw returns and the monthly market buy-and-hold return, compounded 
over 12 months of the fiscal year t. Z_score = Measures the financial strength at the beginning of year t, computed 
as: 0.3*(Net income before extraordinary items/Total assets) + 1.0*(SALES/Total assets) + 1.4*(Retained 
earnings/Total assets) + 1.2*(Working capital/Total assets) + 0.6*(Market value of equity/Total liabilities). Loss 
= An indicator variable equal to one when net income before extraordinary items is negative and zero otherwise. 
To limit the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of their 
distribution. Note that t-statistics are calculated using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and 
possible heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West procedure. They are reported in parentheses. To be 
consistent with the dependent variable, all continuous independent variables are industry-adjusted. To limit 
the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of their 
distribution. 
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Regression analysis of subsequent operating performance in year two of firms just meeting earnings 
benchmarks. 
Panel A: Industry-adjusted return on assets (Adj_ROA t+2) is a proxy for operating performance of firms 
that just meet zero earnings.  
(The table is continued on the next page)
Dependent variable = Two-year-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets 
Independent variables Ab_CFO Ab_DISEX Ab_PROD REM_1 REM_2 
Intercept 
-0.392*** 
(-6.40) 
-0.331*** 
(-6.72) 
-0.318*** 
(-6.49) 
-0.389*** 
(-8.86) 
-0.371*** 
(-7.60) 
Adj_ROA 
0.537*** 
(7.90) 
0.578*** 
(10.72) 
0.621*** 
(8.37) 
0.584*** 
(10.24) 
0.554*** 
(8.47) 
LnMVE 
0.021*** 
(6.28) 
0.020*** 
(7.98) 
0.017*** 
(6.84) 
0.021*** 
(9.39) 
0.022*** 
(8.49) 
MTB 
-0.005*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.006*** 
(-6.24) 
-0.007*** 
(-5.15) 
Return 
0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.004 
(-0.46) 
0.002 
(0.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.23) 
-0.003 
(-0.34) 
Z_score 
0.0002 
(0.89) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
-0.0002 
(-0.81) 
0.0005 
(0.21) 
0.0002 
(1.61) 
Loss 
-0.030*** 
(-2.46) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.56) 
-0.038*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.043*** 
(-5.00) 
AREM 
-0.211*** 
(-6.06) 
-0.366*** 
(-4.40) 
-0.106* 
(-1.76) 
-0.121** 
(-5.83) 
-0.272*** 
(-4.79) 
Suspect_zero 
-0.022** 
(-2.09) 
-0.059*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.037*** 
(-6.63) 
-0.022** 
(-2.40) 
-0.047*** 
(-5.00) 
Suspect_zero*AREM 
0.647** 
(2.03) 
0.448*** 
(4.60) 
0.282*** 
(10.23) 
0.181*** 
(2.58) 
0.391*** 
(4.08) 
No. of observations 3,346 2,860 2,407 3,354 2,852 
𝛂7 + 𝛂9 0.436 0.082** 0.176*** 0.060 0.119 
Mean VIF 1.52 1.48 1.33 1.25 1.56 
Adjusted R-squared 0.480 0.479 0.485 0.477 0.467 
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Panel B: Industry-adjusted return on assets (Adj_ROA t+2) is a proxy for operating performance of firms 
that just meet last year’s earnings. 
Dependent variable = Two-year-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets 
Independent variables Ab_CFO Ab_DISEX Ab_PROD REM_1 REM_2 
Intercept 
-0.394*** 
(-6.51) 
-0.330*** 
(-12.28) 
-0.321*** 
(-6.56) 
-0.390*** 
(-5.87) 
-0.370*** 
(-7.58) 
Adj_ROA 
0.538*** 
(7.88) 
0.595*** 
(10.78) 
0.621*** 
(8.41) 
0.585*** 
(10.29) 
0.554*** 
(8.51) 
LnMVE 
0.021*** 
(6.24) 
0.020*** 
(7.81) 
0.017*** 
(6.82) 
0.021*** 
(6.13) 
0.021*** 
(8.34) 
MTB 
-0.005*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.007*** 
(-5.11) 
Return 
0.001 
(0.13) 
-0.004 
(-0.43) 
0.002 
(0.20) 
-0.002 
(-0.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.32) 
Z_score 
0.0002 
(0.85) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
-0.0003 
(-0.82) 
0.0001 
(0.19) 
0.0002 
(1.56) 
Loss 
-0.029** 
(-2.35) 
-0.049*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.033** 
(-2.37) 
-0.036*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.040*** 
(-4.50) 
AREM 
-0.211*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.368*** 
(-4.46) 
-0.106* 
(-1.87) 
-0.121** 
(-5.85) 
-0.274*** 
(-4.77) 
Suspect_last 
0.006 
(0.41) 
0.027*** 
(5.39) 
0.011*** 
(2.64) 
0.014 
(1.20) 
0.021*** 
(2.59) 
Suspect_last*AREM 
0.458* 
(1.96) 
0.273** 
(2.54) 
0.165*** 
(5.30) 
0.145*** 
(2.62) 
0.251*** 
(3.99) 
No. of observations 3,346 2,860 2,407 3,354 2,852 
𝛂7 + 𝛂9 0.247 -0.095** 0.059** 0.024 -0.023 
Mean VIF 1.66 1.55 1.48 1.21 1.46 
Adjusted R-squared 0.456 0.477 0.482 0.485 0.490 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Table 5 reports the estimation results of Fama-Macbeth regressions for the full sample of firm-year 
observations (4,487 firm-year observations) explaining the dependent variable subsequent operating 
performance (Adj_ROA t+2) of firms just meeting zero earnings and last year’s earnings using the proxies 
of the REM methods. The dependent variable (Adj_ROA t+2) = Two-year-ahead industry-adjusted financial 
performance return on assets, calculated as the differences between firm-specific ROA and median ROA for the 
same year and industry (2-digit SIC code). Adj_ROA = The current period industry-adjusted financial 
performance. AREM = Refers to one of the five measures for abnormal REM activities; Ab_CFO = Abnormal 
cash flows from operations, where Ab_CFO is measured by the estimated residual from the regression equation 
(A-1); Ab_DISEX = Abnormal discretionary expenses, where Ab_DISEX is measured by the estimated residual 
from the regression equation (A-2); Ab_PROD = Abnormal production costs, where Ab_PROD is measured by 
the estimated residual from the regression equation (A-3); REM_1 = The sum of Ab_DISEX*(-1) and Ab_PROD; 
the higher the values of this aggregate measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in real activity 
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manipulation; REM_2 = The sum of Ab_CFO*(-1) and Ab_DISEX*(-1); the higher the values of this aggregate 
measure are, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in real activity manipulation. Suspect = An indicator 
variable for suspect firm-years just meeting earnings benchmarks. Each panel reports the estimation results using 
a different definition of suspect firm-years as discussed below. Panel A reports results for suspects just meeting 
the zero earnings (Suspect_zero), which are firm-years with earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets 
between 0 and 0.005. Panel B reports results for suspects just meeting last year’s earnings (Suspect_last), which 
are firm-years with the change in net income from the last year between 0 and 0.01. Suspect*AREM = An 
interaction term that captures the incremental effects of abnormal REM activities relative to the presence of just 
meeting benchmarks. LnMVE = Logarithm of the market value of equity, measured at the beginning of year t. 
MTB = Market-to-book; the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity, measured at the beginning 
of year t. Return = Market-adjusted abnormal returns is a proxy for the firm’s market performance, calculated as 
the difference between monthly buy-and-hold raw returns and the monthly market buy-and-hold return, 
compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year t. Z_score = Measures the financial strength at the beginning of 
year t, computed as: 0.3*(Net income before extraordinary items/Total assets) + 1.0*(SALES/Total assets) + 
1.4*(Retained earnings/Total assets) + 1.2*(Working capital/Total assets) + 0.6*(Market value of equity/Total 
liabilities). Loss = An indicator variable equal to one when net income before extraordinary items is negative and 
zero otherwise. To limit the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 
1% of their distribution. Note that t-statistics are calculated using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation 
and possible heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West procedure. They are reported in parentheses. To be 
consistent with the dependent variable, all continuous independent variables are industry-adjusted. To limit 
the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of their 
distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
